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BRADLEY P. RICH #2730 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 East 400 South 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ) 
JASON THOMAS GENOVESI, ) Case No. 920803-CA 
) Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for Manslaughter, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1992). This Court obtains 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court's factual findings and conclusions of law are 
insufficiently detail to address all relevant issues. This issue is reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard. State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
2. Whether defendant's wife's consent to the search of the residence she 
jointly occupied with defendant was voluntary under the federal constitution and whether 
she waived her right to refuse consent under the state constitution. This is a mixed 
question of law and fact requiring correctness standard of review for the district court's 
ultimate conclusion and clearly erroneous standard of review for its factual findings. Stale 
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). 
3. Whether the warrantless search conducted in this case violated the 
Utah Constitution, which independently mandate that a consent search be made pursuant 
to a valid waiver. This is a question of law reviewed under the correction of error standard. 
Slate v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993); State v. NaLsbitt, 827 P.2d 969 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
4. Whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of 
defendant's residence. This is a mixed question of law and fact requiring correctness 
standard of review for the district court's ultimate conclusion and clearly erroneous 
standard of review for its factual findings. Stale v. Brown, 1992 WL 355069, at 2 (Utah 
1992); United States v. Stewart, 867 F.2d 581, 584 (10th Cir. 1989); State v. Northrup, 756 
P.2d 1288, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
5. Whether the jury was not impartially impaneled and did not represent 
a cross-section of the community, as to have denied defendant his constitutional rights 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 
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12, of the Utah Constitution, and Utah Code Annotated § 78-46-12 et seq. (1992). This is 
a question of law reviewed for correction of error. State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 
(Utah 1992). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, 
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to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in hie own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife., nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205 (1992): 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; or 
(b) causes the death of another under the influence of 
extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse; or 
(c) causes the death of another under circumstances 
where the actor reasonably believes the circumstances provide 
a legal justification or excuse for his conduct although the 
conduct is not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing 
circumstances. 
(2) Under Subsection (l)(b), emotional disturbance does not include 
a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305. 
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection 
(l)(b), or the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (l)(c), shall be 
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then 
existing circumstances. 
(4) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-46-12 (1992): 
(1) Prospective jurors shall be selected at random from the master jury list 
and, if qualified, placed on the qualified jury list. A prospective juror shall remain 
on the qualified jury list for no longer than six months or for such shorter period 
established by rule of the Judicial Council. The qualified jury list may be sued by all 
courts within the county, but no person shall be summoned to serve as a juror in 
more than one court. 
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(2) The Judicial Council shall by rule govern the process for the qualification 
of jurors and the selection of qualified jurors for voir dire. 
(3) The state court administrator shall develop a standard form for the 
qualification of jurors. The form shall include: 
(a) the name, address, and daytime telephone number 
of the prospective juror; 
(b) questions suitable for determining whether the 
prospective juror is competent under statute to serve as a juror; 
(c) the person's declaration that the responses to 
questions on the qualification form are true to the best of the 
person's knowledge; and 
(d) a statement that a willful misrepresentation of a 
material fact is punishable as a class C misdemeanor. 
(4) Any prospective juror who fails to return a completed form as instructed 
shall be directed by the court to appear before the clerk to complete the form. A 
person who fails to appear is subject to the procedures and penalties in Section 78-
46-20. 
(5) Any person who willfully misrepresents a material fact on a juror 
qualification form for the purpose of avoiding or securing service as a juror is guilty 
of a class C misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-46-16 (1992): 
(1) Within seven days after the moving party discovered, or by the exercise 
of diligence could have discovered the grounds therefore, and in any event before 
the trial jury is sworn to try the case, a party may move to stay the proceedings or 
to quash an indictment, or for other appropriate relief, on the ground of substantial 
failure to comply with this act in selecting a grand or trial jury. 
(2) Upon motion filed under this section containing a sworn statement of 
acts which if true would constitute a substantial failure to comply with this act, the 
moving party may present testimony of the county clerk, the clerk of the court, any 
relevant records and papers not public or otherwise available used by the jury 
commission or the clerk, and any other relevant evidence. If the court determines 
that in selecting either a grand or a trial jury there has been a substantial failure to 
comply with this act and it appears that actual and substantial injustice and prejudice 
has resulted or will result to a party in consequence of the failure, the court shall 
stay the proceedings pending the selection of the jury in conformity with this act, 
quash an indictment, or grant other appropriate relief. 
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(3) The procedures prescribed by this section are the exclusive means by 
which a person accused of a crime, the state, or a party in a civil case may challenge 
a jury on the ground that the jury was not selected in conformity with this act. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant-appellant, Jason Thomas Genovesi ("Genovesi"), was charged 
by Information with criminal homicide, murder, a first degree felony, alleging that on or 
about March 20, 1992, Genovesi intentionally and knowingly caused the death of Gavin 
Adams, his step-son. This is a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1992) (R.7). By 
a motion to suppress, Genovesi objected prior to trial to the use of evidence which he 
claimed resulted from an unlawful search of his residence. The motion was denied (R.112-
113). On October 6th through 8th, 1992, Genovesi was tried before a jury. At trial, 
Genovesi objected that the jury panel had not been drawn from a cross-section of the 
population as required by law, but from only a portion of the alphabet, particularly 
surnames beginning with letters "S" and "T'.1 The district court overruled the objection 
(Tr.17-18). On October 8,1992, the jury eventually found Genovesi guilty of manslaughter, 
a lesser included offense (R.217, 224). He was thereafter sentenced to an indeterminate 
1
 See Trial Transcript of 10/6/92, hereinafter "Tr.," at 12, attached to this Brief as 
Addendum IV. 
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term in prison of one to fifteen years on November 16, 1992 (R.224).2 This appeal then 
ensued (R.228). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Genovesi was charged by Information alleging that on or about March 20, 
1992, Genovesi intentionally and knowingly caused the death of Gavin Adams. This is a 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1992) (R.7). Genovesi filed a motion to suppress 
evidence, claiming the evidence gathered was a fruit of an unlawful search of his residence 
(R.30-31).3 The district court denied the motion (R.l 12-113). 
At trial, it appeared from the roster of qualified jurors that the venire had not 
been drawn from a cross-section of the community, but from only a portion of the 
alphabets (Tr.5). The jury clerk for the district court testified that the computer had initially 
selected 4,000 prospective jurors at random from the master jury list. Out of that number 
2,900 names were qualified for jury service. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-12 (1992). Then, 
the computer was asked to select a smaller pool of jurors to serve in this case. However, 
rather than selecting a pool consisting of surnames beginning with letters "A" through "Z", 
the computer erroneously selected names in blocks, with significant number of names 
beginning with letters "S" and "T? and excluding most other alphabets (Tr.7-9). Genovesi 
2
 Record Document #224 is "Judgment," attached to this Brief as Addendum II. 
3
 The facts relative to the suppression issue are set in detail infra, POINT I. 
- 7 -
timely objected to that procedure, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-16(1) (1992); Utah R. Crim. 
P. 18(c); State v. Harmon, 805 P.2d 769, 776 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), which objection was 
overruled by the district court (Tr.17-18). Genovesi then went to trial and was found guilty 
of manslaughter by a jury in Salt Lake County on October 8, 1992 (R.217). 
Thereafter, Genovesi was sentenced to an indeterminate term in prison of one 
to fifteen years on November 16, 1992 (R.224). A Notice of Appeal was then timely filed 
in the district court (R.228). There are no prior or related appeals in this matter. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Because the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
inadequate to allow meaningful appellate review, this Court should remand the case for 
further findings and conclusions. In the event this Court finds the record sufficient enough 
for review, Genovesi urges this Court to conclude that Mrs. Genovesi's consent to search 
was involuntary and not a valid waiver of a constitutional right. 
No exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of the Genovesi 
residence under either the state or federal constitution. 
The warrantless search of the Genovesi residence independently violated 
article 1, section 14, of the Utah Constitution because there was no valid waiver of the right 
to refuse consent to search. 
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Genovesi was deprived of his constitutional right to a jury representing the 
cross-section of the community when the district court excluded from the venire persons 
with surnames beginning with letters "A" through "R". 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews a district court's factual findings on a motion to suppress 
for clear error. However, the court's ultimate legal conclusions based on the underlying 
facts, such as whether consent was properly obtained, or the magnitude of protection 
afforded by the state constitution, are reviewed de novo, for correction of error. See State 
v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). See 
generally Slate v. Thurman, 846 R2d 1256, 1270-71 (Utah 1993). 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW ARE INADEQUATE AND CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
1. Facts: 
The following facts were developed at the hearing on Genovesi's motion to 
suppress: On March 20, 1992, paramedics were dispatched to a residence at 5459 West 
Balsa Avenue, Kearns, Utah, to investigate injury to, and possible death of, a two-year old 
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child.4 After the paramedics had left the residence, sheriff deputies from Salt Lake County 
arrived. When they arrived, the deputies were satisfied that there were no other persons 
in the residence who could be in danger. The emergency that necessitated their presence 
at the residence had been taken care of at this point (Mtr. 13). 
Later that afternoon, Gavin Adams was pronounced dead at the Pioneer 
Valley Memorial Hospital. Sheriff deputy Kenneth Patrick ("Patrick"), who was on the 
scene that day testified that the deputies conducted a warrantless, consentless search of the 
residence, took pictures of the scene and removed a wash rag therefrom (Mtr. 7, 10, 14). 
Thereafter, the deputies arrested Genovesi (Mtr. 14). 
Subsequently, Patrick went back to the residence the following day, March 
21, 1992, again without a warrant. This time, he claimed to have telephonically contacted 
and obtained permission to "look for evidence and tak[ej measurements" from Lisa 
Genovesi, Gavin Adams' mother and Genovesi's wife (Mtr. 7-8, 16). Prior to the search, 
Patrick did not inform Mrs. Genovesi that she did not have to consent (Mtr. 8). Mrs. 
Genovesi told patrick that the residence key was with a friend, Randy Beagley. Patrick 
then contacted Beagley and told him to bring the key to the residence (Mtr. 9-10). While 
in the residence, Patrick and other sheriff deputies removed hair samples, cut out a piece 
4
 See Transcript of Motion to Suppress, 8/19/92, hereinafter "Mtr.," at 6, 12. The 
transcripts have been redesignated in the record index as items 236-291. For clarity 
purposes, Genovesi will reference the original page numbers of the transcripts. 
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of the wall and sections of the carpet, and took photographs and measurements (Mtr. 10-
i i ) . 
2. The District Court's Findings and Conclusions: 
The district court found that Patrick had permission from Mrs. Genovesi to 
conduct the warrantless search. Order 11 l.5 The court then went on to conclude that the 
law in Utah "allows one spouse to consent to the search of property owned or used jointly 
with the other spouse." Id. H 2. 
3. The District Court Clearly Erred: 
Genovesi is aware that "fa]n appellant raising issues of fact on appeal must 
. . . marshall all the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and then show that 
evidence to be insufficient." State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734-735 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). Accord, State v. Gallegos, 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 51 
(Ct. App. 1993). The district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error and its 
legal conclusions are reviewed for correction of error. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1270-71 (Utah 1993). 
a. The March 20th Search: 
Marshalling the evidence, if Patrick had in fact testified that he had the 
permission of Mrs. Genovesi prior to conducting the March 20th search, the court's 
5
 "Order" is Record Document #112, attached to this Brief as Addendum I. 
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findings will be credible. As the record vividly demonstrates, however, Patrick testified that 
at no point on March 20 did he did request or receive permission to search. See Mtr. 14, 
18. See, e.g., Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 22, 105 S. Ct. 409, 412 (1984) (no consent 
where both officers "explicitly testified that they had received no consent 1o search.") 
Consequently, the district court's factual findings are "against the clear weight of the 
evidence," Stale v. Rochell, 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 43 (Ct. App. 1993) (Bench, J., 
concurring), because erroneous and not supported by the evidence, see State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
b. The March 21st Search: 
The district court's finding that Patrick obtained permission from Mrs. 
Genovesi to conduct the March 21st search is also erroneous. It is true that Patrick 
testified that he telephonically contacted Mrs. Genovesi and told her that he wanted to go 
into the residence to obtain measurements and Mrs. Genovesi responded "yes." Mtr. 8-9. 
This testimony could conceivably support the district court's consent finding. However, 
Patrick also testified that he did not explain to Mrs. Genovesi that he would be conducting 
a thorough search for criminal evidence. Neither did he inform her that she could withhold 
consent to his request to search. In addition, Patrick could not have determined, and the 
district court made no finding, that Mrs. Genovesi's consent was specific and unequivocal, 
particularly where the alleged consent was obtained over the telephone. See Mtr. 15-16. 
Thus, Mrs. Genovesi's response could not be characterized as spontaneous and specific; 
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rather, it is a mere acquiescence to the demands of a police officer. See State v. Sims, 808 
P.2d 141, 151 (Utah Ct App. 1991). See generally State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 468-469 n.8 
(Utah Ct. App.) cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (1992) (ultimate conclusion of this nature by 
trial court defeats purpose of appellate review). 
More important, the district court's conclusion of law on the consent issue 
clearly is incorrect. See Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1270-71 (trial court's ultimate determination 
of consent is reviewed for correctness). Accord, Rochell, 210 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41; 
Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 654. The district court made neither a finding nor conclusion 
regarding whether Mrs. Genovesi's alleged consent was voluntary and of free will, and not 
a mere acquiescence to lawful authority. The court merely concluded that Mrs. Genovesi 
consented to the search. Order If 2. But see State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (conclusory finding that defendant "consented" to search and there was no 
evidence of coercion "not particularly helpful in determining whether . . . consent was 
'unequivocal and specific'"). Cf. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
Further, Genovesi contended below that the alleged consent search 
independently violated Article 1, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution (Mtr. 22-27). See 
State v. Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (argument for independent state 
constitutional analysis should begin in trial court). The district court made no finding or 
conclusion on whether the search independently ran afoul the state constitution. See 
Order. 
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Consequently, the district court's findings and conclusions are "very sketchy 
and entirely failed to address critical issues," Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 770, thus leaving this 
Court with no "determination to review." Carter, 812 P.2d at 465. Accord, Lopez, 831 P.2d 
at 1043-44, 1050; Marshall, 791 P.2d at 882. Because this Court lacks the necessary 
information to undertake meaningful review of the issues raised by Genovesi, this case must 
be remanded to the district court for a detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. See 
generally State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 227 (Utah 1989); Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 n.ll; 
Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1050. In the event this Court were to review the district court's findings 
and conclusions, Genovesi submits the following argument. 
POINT II 
MRS. GENOVESI'S CONSENT TO SEARCH THE RESIDENCE WAS 
INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS INVOLUNTARY AND NOT A VALID 
WAIVER OF A KNOWN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. 
A. Standard of Review: 
This Court reviews the factual findings on a trial court's determination of 
voluntariness of consent under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 
1301 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). However, the ultimate conclusion of the district court on 
whether there was a valid consent, a legal question, is reviewed de novo. Id. See generally 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270-71 (Utah 1993)(finally resolving the split in this 
Court on appropriate standard of reviewing consent issue). 
B. Lack of Adequate Factual Findings Requires A Remand: 
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The district court concluded that Mrs. Genovesi consented to the search of 
the Genovesi residence. See Order 11 1. This decision, as assailed in POINT I, supra, is 
insufficient and not particularly helpful in examining voluntariness of Mrs. Genovesi's 
consent. The court made no finding on whether the consent was free, equivocal, specific, 
and therefore voluntary. See Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17,105 S. Ct. 409 (1984)(any 
claim of consent to search in death scene cases measured against traditional consent 
standards). Nor did the court determine if the consent was a valid waiver of a known 
constitutional right, in comport with the state constitutional requirements. See Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 876; Marshall, 791 P.2d at 888 (conclusory finding on consent insufficient in 
determining whether consent was unequivocal or specific). 
Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent 
part: 
A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial . . . . Where 
factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its 
findings on the record. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(emphasis added). In addition, this Court consistently has required 
detailed findings of fact when the State presents consent to search as an issue. See Vigil, 
815 P.2d at 1296, 1300; State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 777 n.ll (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Accord, Burks v. State, 706 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
Because the district court's findings in this case do not address issues of 
significance, this Court lacked the necessary tool to undertake meaningful review of the 
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factual and legal issues raised in Genovesi's motion to suppress. Under these 
circumstances, Genovesi urges this Court to remand this case to the district court for 
detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
C. Lack of Consent Requires Reversal: 
Were this Court to review the district court's cursory denial of the motion to 
suppress, Genovesi submits that the district court erred. 
1. Federal Constitutional Analysis 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that all 
searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause. See U.S. Const, 
amend. IV. A warrantless search of a citizen's residence is per se unreasonable unless the 
government shows that the search falls within a recognized exception, Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971), such as a valid consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). The government has the burden of proving that consent was 
given freely, voluntarily, without duress or coercion,6 and that burden must be shouldered 
by clear and convincing testimony. United States v. Butler, 966 F.2d 559, 562 (10th Cir. 
6
 Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the Utah Supreme Court provided guidance 
as to 
[fjactors which may show a lack of duress or coercion including] 1) 
absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) absence of an 
exhibition of force; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the 
owner; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer. 
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). 
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1992).7 In addition, even in homicide cases, any claim of consent to search is measured 
against the traditional consent standards. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 22, 105 S. 
Ct 409, 412 (1984). 
Genovesi does not question his wife's authority to consent to the search of 
their residence. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993 (1974); 
State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). However, the district court made 
no findings regarding whether Mrs. Genovesi freely and voluntarily consented to the 
officers' entry into the residence without duress or coercion and, if so, for what purpose. 
As such, the record before this Court clearly does not support the district court's cursory 
conclusion that the warrantless search was in comport with the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. If the court finds the record sufficient, Genovesi submits the 
following argument. 
In State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050 (Utah 1987), a homicide case, the supreme 
court held that the defendant's girlfriend properly consented to the search of the residence 
she shared with the defendant. In Valdez, the girlfriend not only physically handed to the 
officers the key to the residence, but also consented to the search upon the advice and in 
7
 Federal courts no longer indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of 
right to refuse consent. See Butler, 966 F.2d at 562; United Stales v. Price, 925 F.2d 
1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1991). But see, e.g., Slate v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122, 127 (Utah Ct 
App. 1991)(courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of right to 
refuse consent and waiver must be proven by convincing evidence); State v. Carter, 812 
P.2d 460, 467 (Utah Ct App.) (same), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
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the present of her attorney. See Valdez, 748 P.2d at 1056. In Thurman, also a homicide 
case, prior to searching Thurman's vehicles and storage units, the officers read Thurman 
his Miranda rights and also read verbatim to him a consent to search form. Thurman then 
signed the form. The Utah Supreme Court held that Thurman's consent was voluntary. 
See Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1273. These cases obviously are distinguishable. Mrs. Genovesi 
signed neither a consent form nor did she consent in the presence of an attorney. 
In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550, 88 S. Ct. 1788 (1968), the 
United States Supreme Court found involuntary and equivocal the defendant's statement, 
"come on in and go ahead and search." See also United Stales v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423, 
1426 (9th Cir. 1990)(judicial concern to protect sanctity of home is so elevated that free 
and intelligent consent may not be shown by mere acquiescence to lawful authority). 
In this case, Patrick testified that Mrs. Genovesi gave him permission to go 
into the residence to look and take measurements. See Tr. at 7. Mrs. Genovesi's alleged 
consent is defective in the constitutional sense for two reasons. First, the consent, like 
Bumper's, was involuntary and equivocal in that it merely represents acquiescence to lawful 
authority, rather than a free and intelligent response. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550. 
Second, the "consent," if any, was a limited permission to allow the officers to enter the 
residence to take measurements, not an authorization to tear up walls and carpets. See 
United States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dewitt, 946 F.2d 
1497, 1500 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1233 (1992). Therefore, even if Mrs. 
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Genovesi voluntarily permitted the officers to enter the residence, the permission was a 
limited one, which they clearly exceeded by conducting a full blown search. 
Further, knowledge by a suspect of his or her right to refuse consent is highly 
relevant in determining whether consent is valid. See United States v. Medenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 558-59 (1980); United States v. Child, 944 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, the 
officers did not inform Mrs. Genovesi that she could refuse to allow them into his 
apartment to conduct a warrantless search. Compare United States v. Stallings, 810 F.2d 
973, 976 (10th Cir. 1987)(finding valid consent where officers "repeatedly told defendant 
that he was not required to consent to the search") with United States v. Laymon, 730 F. 
Supp. 332 (D. Colo. 1990)(finding invalid consent where, inter alia, officer did not advise 
defendant that he could refuse consent). Therefore, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the State failed to carry the burden of showing voluntary consent. 
Because the State has not by clear and convincing evidence show that Mrs. 
Genovesi voluntarily consented to the warrantless entry and search of his apartment, the 
district court's cursory conclusion to the contrary is erroneous and should be reversed. C/, 
e.g., United States v. Riiminer, 786 F.2d 381, 383 (10th Cir. 1986)(credible evidence 
supported district court's conclusion that search warrant was properly executed). 
2. State Constitutional Analysis 
A determination of consent is fact-sensitive and "cannot rest on . . . a cursory 
observation," but must be made from the totality of the surrounding circumstances. State 
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v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). To sustain its burden, (1) the State must 
show by clear and convincing evidence that consent was intelligently and voluntarily given, 
(2) without duress or coercion, and (3) the courts indulge every reasonable presumption 
against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. See id.; State v. Small, 829 P.2d 129, 
130 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).8 In 
examining the surrounding circumstances, "a court must take into account both the details 
of police conduct and the characteristics of the accused, . . . which include 'subtly coercive 
police questions as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who 
consents.'" State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing State v. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), and quoting Schnecklolh v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
229 (1973)). 
In addition, article 1, section 14, of the Utah Constitution, which should be 
interpreted more broadly than the fourth amendment,9 requires the State to prove validity 
of consent by demonstrating that a suspect was made aware of his or her right to refuse 
8
 But see supra note 7. Genovesi submits that article 1, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, which provides broader protection than the Fourth Amendment, requires 
the courts to indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental 
rights. See POINT III, infra. 
9
 See POINT III, infra. See generally Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S. Ct. 
788 (1967)(each state can interpret its constitution more broadly than federal 
constitution); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040 
(1980)(same). 
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consent, i.e, overcome the presumption that citizens do not lightly waive fundamental 
constitutional rights. The so-called voluntariness/totality-of-circumstances test articulated 
in Schneckloth, which had proven itself elusive and "unworkable" in the confession setting 
until Miranda,10 has roundly been criticized.11 Clearly, the validity of a consent to search 
is called into doubt if one is unaware of the right to refuse consent.12 Only by requiring 
that a suspect be made aware of the right to refuse consent can a consent be deemed 
intelligent and voluntary in the constitutional sense.13 Thus, Genovesi suggests that a 
Miranda-type warning should be sine qua non to validity of consent to search under the 
Utah Constitution.14 
10
 Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth 
Amendment and the "Old" Voluntariness Test, 65 Mic.L.Rev. 59, 99-104 (1966). 
11
 See Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 448, 81 S. Ct. 1541, 1550 (1961)(Clark, J., 
dissenting); LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 8.2, at 
175 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1993); Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 
U.Chi.L.Rev. 47, 57 (1974). 
12
 See generally Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent (less) Police Searches, 69 
Wash.U.L.Q. 175, 193 (1991); Wilberding, Miranda-Type Warnings for Consent Searches, 
47 North Dak.L.Rev. 281, 284 (1971); Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § SS 
240.2 (1975). Cf Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 
(1938)(defining waiver of constitutional rights as an "intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege"). 
13
 See State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66, 67 (1975). 
14
 Genovesi suggests a person asked to consent should be advised thus: You have a 
right to refuse permission for any search. If you withhold consent, we would be 
required to request a search warrant from a judge, which warrant would only issue if we 
could show the judge probable cause to believe [the item sought] will be found. If you 
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This argument is not radical or novel. For example, in Zerbst, the Supreme 
Court held that a citizen should be made aware of his or her constitutional right before the 
right is considered waived.15 Almost three decades ago, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
read its state constitution as requiring the State to show validity of consent in terms of 
waiver: 
[UJnder . . . our State Constitution the validity of a consent to search, even 
in a non-custodial situation, must be measured in terms of waiver, i.e., where 
the State seeks to justify a search on the basis of consent it has the burden 
of showing that the consent was voluntary, an essential element of which is 
knowledge of the right to refuse consent. 
State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66, 67 (1975)(interpreting Article 1, Paragraph 7 of 
the New Jersey Constitution, which is fourth amendment verbatim). Realizing the 
hollowness of the claim that a suspect "consented" to a search without having been 
informed that she could refuse consent, other state courts have also interpreted their state 
constitution as requiring the State to demonstrate voluntariness of a consent to search by 
a knowing waiver. See, e.g., Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547, 551 (Miss. 1983)(interpreting 
Article 3, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution), reiterated, Longstreet v. State, 592 
consent to the search, any incriminating evidence found can and will be used against 
you. 
15
 See Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S. Ct. at 1023. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 86 S. Ct 1602 (1966)(Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
prohibits admitting statements given by suspect during custodial interrogation without 
benefit of warning that statements might be used against suspect). 
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So.2d 16, 19 (Miss. 1991 ).16 Genovesi urges this Court to hold that article 1, section 14, 
similarly requires that a suspect's knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a condition 
precedent to finding a consent valid. 
A. Was the Consent Freely and Intelligently Given? 
Patrick testified that he requested consent to look for evidence and take 
measurements from Mrs. Genovesi over the telephone. He claimed Ms. Genovesi said 
"yes". At no time, however, did Patrick specifically asked Mrs. Genovesi if he could remove 
a piece of the wall and carpet (Mtr. 15-16). Moreover, because the alleged consent was 
obtained over the phone, Patrick could not have assessed Mrs. Genovesi's demeanor to 
determine if she was in fact consenting to the search. Thus, consent could not have been 
freely and intelligently given under these circumstances. See Thompson, 469 U.S. at 22, 105 
S. Ct at 412 (call for help was not an invitation to conduct warrantless search). Cf. United 
States v. DiChiarinte, 445 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971). 
In addition, at the time the consent was obtained, Mrs. Genovesi's two-year 
old child had just died. Looking at the "vulnerable subjective state of [Mrs. Genovesi,] the 
person who consents," Robinson, 797 P.2d at 437, there is no question that her will was 
16
 Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution provides: 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and possessions, from 
unreasonable seizure or search; and no warrant shall be issued without 
probable cause,supported by oath or affirmation, specially designating the 
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. 
Miss. Const, art. Ill, § 23. 
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overborne by the police officers and, therefore, she could not have given a voluntary and 
intelligent consent.17 
Moreover, Mrs. Genovesi was not informed of the right to refuse consent. 
Knowledge by a suspect of his or her right to refuse consent, though merely a relevant 
factor in determining whether consent is intelligent and voluntary under the federal 
constitution,18 is a sine qua non under the Utah Constitution. See POINT III, infra. Here, 
Mrs. Genovesi was never informed of her right to refuse Patrick's request to enter, remain 
in, or search the residence. See Johnson, 68 N.J. at 349, 346 A.2d at 66 (an essential 
element of proving validity of consent is showing suspect had knowledge of right to refuse 
consent).19 Thus, her consent, if any, was obtained in violation of Utah Constitution, 
article 1, section 14. 
17
 See LaFave, § 8.2(e) ("It is equally appropriate to take account of the individual's 
mental or emotional state at the time the consent was given"); cf United Slates v. 
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1520-1521 (10th Cir. 1988) (fact that defendant's wife was 
pregnant at time of illegal stop by officers should be a factor to consider in analyzing 
voluntariness of defendant's consent to search). 
18
 See United Stales v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558-590 (1980); United States v. 
Stallings, 810 F.2d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1987); Carter, 812 P.2d at 468. 
19
 Compare Robinson, 797 P.2d at 438 (consent involuntary where "|t]here is no 
evidence that Robinson was aware or was informed that he did not have to accede to 
the trooper's request [to search]") with State v. Hargraves, 806 P.2d 228., 231 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (consent voluntary where defendant read and signed consent form) and Stale 
v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (consent voluntary where defendant 
in residential search was given consent form to sign and told if she did not consent to 
warrantless search one would not be conducted). 
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B. Was The Consent A Product Of Coercion? 
In State v. Whitlenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980), the Utah supreme 
court, interpreting the fourth amendment, held that the absence of coercion or claim of 
authority by the police could aid the trial court in finding voluntary consent. Here, the 
district court made no finding on whether Mrs. Genovesi was under duress or felt coerced 
by Patrick. Without the assistance of such a critical finding, the district court inadvertently 
invited a remand, because there is no determination for this Court to review. State v. 
Marshall 791 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Moreover, the evidence clearly implied, and Mrs. Genovesi could reasonably 
have believed, that the officers had the authority to enter and search the residence. Mere 
acquiescence in the face of show of police authority does not constitute voluntary consent. 
See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (consent involuntary where police officer 
told defendant's grandmother, and the latter reasonably believed, that the officer had 
authority to enter and search defendant's residence). Simply because Patrick did not draw 
a weapon or use a commanding tone of voice does not support a non-coercive encounter. 
See United Stales v. Ward, 961 F.2d 1526, 15, 34 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bloom, 
975 F.2d 1447, 1455 & n.9 (10th Cir. 1992). 
C. Was The Scope Of Consent Transcended? 
Even if a citizen voluntarily consents, the ensuing search must be limited in 
scope to the particular area agreed to. "The scope of a consent search is limited by the 
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breadth of the actual consent itself Any police activity that transcends the actual scope 
of the consent given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect."1 
Marshall 791 P.2d at 888 (quoting United Stales v. Gay, 114 F.2d 368, 375 (10th Cir. 1985)). 
Accord, State v. Dunn, P.2d , 1993 WL 79651, at 13 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). For example, in People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 
193 (Colo. 1984), the Colorado Supreme Court concluded: 
What the defendant agreed to was to permit the officers to "look around" the 
house. A "look around" connotes a casual observation of the premises. The 
"look around," however, consisted of a search of the defendant's house by 
four officers over a period of forty-five minutes, including an inspection of 
piles of clothes and debris, and an examination of drawers, boxes and other 
closed containers. This extensive type of search was far in excess of the "look 
around" authorized by the defendant^ ] 
Thiret, 685 P,2d at 201. In Robinson, this Court cited and made references to Thiret as an 
example of a case where a search was conducted in excess of the scope of consent. See 
Robinson, 791 P.2d at 888. 
In the instant case, Patrick asked Mrs. Genovesi if he could look around and 
take measurements. This, however, turned into a major search and seizure by the officers. 
Indeed, they literally took over the Genovesi residence, tore up walls and carpets as if they 
had been authorized to seize it. Under those circumstances, there is no question that the 
officers exceeded the scope of Mrs. Genovesi's consent, if a consent was in fact voluntarily 
given. See Thiret, 685 P.2d at 201. 
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POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD INDEPENDENTLY INTERPRET ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION FROM THE 
INTERPRETATION GIVEN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BY THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND CONCLUDE THAT A 
CONSENT SEARCH IS VALID UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
ONLY IF THE SUSPECT MAKES A KNOWING WAIVER OF HIS OR 
HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Although Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution is Fourth 
Amendment verbatim, this court should independently interpret that provision from the 
interpretation given the amendment by the United States Supreme Court.20 Pursuant to 
the primacy model of constitutional interpretation,21 the Utah constitution should be the 
primary source for protecting citizens' rights. Secondly, independent interpretation by this 
court will foster predictability and "insulate[s] the states' citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal courts."22 
Thirdly, such independent interpretation will positively reinvigorate the state's sovereignty 
20
 See State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986) (imploring Utah lawyers to brief 
Utah courts on state constitutional issues); Stale v. While, 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 59, 60 
(Ct. App. 1993); Stale v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 868 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (same). 
21
 The primacy model posits that, because several state constitutions predate the 
federal constitution, "state constitutions should be looked to first in developing 
protections for individual rights." Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State 
Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 319, 326 n.34. See also Linde, First Things First: 
Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. Bait. L. Rev. 379, 380 (1980). 
22
 Slate v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988). 
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under our federal system of government.23 More importantly, Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution should be interpreted differently from the fourth amendment because 
of the following reasons: 
A. Utah's Unique History 
No other territory experienced the difficulties encountered by Utah before 
obtaining statehood. The difficulties stemmed mainly from the settlers' practice of slavery 
and polygamy, the twin "sins" that made Congress look unfavorably towards granting 
statehood to the territory.24 
Utahns drafted seven constitutions before the state was admitted into the 
Union. The first, the Constitution of Deseret of 1849, served as the model for other Utah 
constitutions.25 There is disagreement, however, on whether the 1849 Constitution was 
patterned after the Illinois Constitution of 181826 or the Iowa Constitution of 1846.27 
23
 See Linde, supra note 21, at 383. 
24
 See E. Firmage and R. Mangrum, Zion in the Courts 127 (Univ. Illinois Press 
1988); Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government--The History of Utah's Constitution, 
1966 Utah L. Rev. 311, 316; Hickman, Utah Constitutional Law 45 (1954) (unpublished 
thesis in University of Utah Library). 
25
 See Flynn, supra note 24, at 315; Hickman, supra note 24, at 42. 
26
 See id. (arguing Illinois). 
27
 See Crawley, The Constitution of the Slate of Deseret, 29 B.Y.U Studies 7, 15 
(1989), stating that several articles in the 1849 Constitution were copied "word for word" 
from the Iowa Constitution, which today is federal and Utah constitutions verbatim. 
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Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the last Utah constitution, adopted in 1896, borrowed 
heavily from the constitutions of Nevada, Washington, Illinois and New York.28 
Utah's constitutions, like many other state constitutions drafted in the 
nineteenth century, reflect the prevailing sentiment of deep mistrust of the government.29 
Article 8 of the 1849 Constitution, for example, prohibited unreasonable searches and 
seizures,™ and subsequent Utah constitutions similarly prohibited such searches. 
Historically, Utah judges have never hesitated in finding unconstitutional searches 
conducted on less than probable cause or statutes authorizing them.11 
The utmost devotion by these judges to constitutionally sound searches 
stemmed apparently from their unique experience as citizens of the Utah territory.32 As 
mentioned earlier, the settlers widely practiced polygamy, a "relief] of barbarism" that 
28
 See generally Flynn, supra note 24, at 323. 
29
 See id. at 314. 
30
 See Crawley, supra note 27, at 16. Unfortunately, as of today, research has not 
discovered a contemporaneous legislative debate on the adoption of this provision. 
Nonetheless, it is well documented that residents of the Utah territory were generally 
familiar with unconstitutional searches and the constitutions of other states prohibiting 
unreasonable searches and seizures. See Ivins, A Constitution for Utah, 25 Hist. Q. 95, 
100 (1957); Flynn, supra note 24. 
31
 See generally Hickman, supra note 24, at 386-390. 
32
 It is no longer folklore that early Mormon settlers were intolerantly driven to the 
territory from New York, Illinois, Missouri and Pennsylvania. See Firmage and 
Mangrum, supra note 24, at 125-27. 
- 2 9 -
Congress was determined to stamp out.33 Therefore, it is not uncommon for federal 
marshals, in blatant violation of the fourth amendment, to break into churches and homes 
during the day or at night in search of polygamists.34 To the dismay of early Utahns, night 
time search, "the evil in its most obnoxious form,"35 was conducted with great frequency 
and without probable cause.36 A frustrated and weary Mormon leader once decried these 
searches as a "perversion of the Constitution."37 Article I Section 14, thus, is not a 
wholesale adoption of the search and seizure provisions of other state constitutions, but a 
Hickman, supra note 24, at 45; Firmage and Mangrum, supra note 24, at 127, 160. 
34
 See Bradley, Hide and Seek: Children on the Underground, 51 Utah Hist. Q. 133, 
142 (1983) (recounting how the home of a polygamist was searched 100 times in four 
years). See also "How They Do It," Deseret News Weekly, Jan. 20, 1886, at 1 (recounting 
how federal marshals clearly engaged in unconstitutional search of a polygamist's home 
by breaking the door with an axe without the authority of a warrant). 
Professor Firmage similarly observes that during the nineteenth century "federal 
attempts to simplify and expedite the conviction of polygamists routinely denied 
Mormons of many of their fundamental rights." Firmage, Religion and the Law: The 
Mormon Experience in the Nineteenth Century, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 765, 781 (1991). 
35
 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also 
State v. Lindner, 592 P.2d 852, 857 (Idaho 1979) ("entry into an occupied dwelling in the 
middle of the night is clearly a greater invasion of privacy than entry executed during 
the daytime"). 
36
 See Deseret News Weekly, Jan 20, 1886, at 1; Jan. 27, 1886, at 26; June 10, 1885, at 
1. 
37
 First Presidency Message to General Conference of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, Deseret News Weekly, April 13 & 14, 1886, at 196 (quoted in 
Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah 
Constitution, Article 1, Section 14, 17 J. Contemp. Law 267, 279 n.80 (1991). 
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reflection of the deep distrust of Utahns for government and for unreasonable searches or 
those conducted without probable cause.38 
B. Propriety of Independent Review under the Federal System 
In our federal system, it is entirely proper for a state court to interpret its 
constitution in a manner different from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation 
of a similar federal provision.39 In the recent past, state courts have been interpreting 
their own constitutions differently from federal interpretation to provide broader 
protections to their citizens.40 
38
 See Hickman, supra note 24, at 386-90. 
39
 See Fox Film Corp. v. Midler, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 
125 (1945); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm., 379 U.S. 487, 489 (1965); see also 
State v. Marsalla, 579 A.2d 58, 63 (Conn. 1990) (in interpreting its own constitution, a 
state court sits as "a court of last resort, subject only to the qualification that [its] 
interpretations may not restrict the guarantees accorded the national citizenry under the 
federal charter"). See generally Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution, 2 Utah B.J. 25 
(Nov. 1989). But cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (admonishing state 
courts to make a clear and concise statement of the independent state ground of their 
decision). 
40
 See Collins, Reliance on Slate Constitutions-Away From A Reactionaiy Approach, 9 
Hastings Const. L. Q. 1, 2-3 (1981); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: 
State Courts Erosion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L. J. 421, 425 (1974). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has not been hesitant in independently interpreting 
the Utah Constitution in a broad range of issues.41 In State v. Larroco, 794 P.2d 460 
(Utah 1990), the court departed from confusing and irreconcilable federal automobile 
search and seizure jurisprudence.42 It held that under Article I, Section 14, a warrantless 
automobile search is per se unconstitutional except when effectuated with probable cause 
and to "protect safety of police or the public or to prevent the destruction of evidence." 
Id, at 470. More recently, the Court similarly held that the exclusionary rule applies under 
the Utah Constitution in quasi-criminal tax stamp cases. See ZLssi v. State Tax Comm. of 
Utah, 842 P.2d 848, 859 (Utah 1992) ("Utah Constitution's exclusionary rule prevents] the 
Commission from admitting in evidence drugs [illegally] taken from [the suspect's] car"). 
C The Consent Search in This Case Lacked A Valid Waiver 
As pointed out above, Mrs. Genovesi was not informed of the right to refuse 
consent Knowledge by a suspect of his or her right to refuse consent, though merely a 
relevant factor in determining whether consent is intelligent and voluntary under the 
federal constitution, is a sine qua non under the Utah Constitution. Here, Mrs. Genovesi 
41
 See Comment, supra note 21, at 320 (chronicling independent interpretation by 
the Utah Supreme Court on right of access to preliminary hearings, parental rights, 
separation of power, self-incrimination and standing). 
42
 See also People v. PJ. Video, Inc., 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (New York 1986) ("fourth 
amendment rules governing police conduct have been muddied and, and judicial 
supervision of the warrant process diluted"). 
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was never informed of her right to refuse Patrick's request to enter, remain in, or search 
the residence. See Johnson, 68 N.J. at 349, 346 A.2d at 66 (an essential element of proving 
validity of consent is showing suspect had knowledge of right to refuse consent).43 As 
such, she could not have intelligently waived her constitutional right. Thus, consent, if any, 
was obtained in violation of Mrs. Genovesi's rights under Utah Constitution, article 1, 
section 14. 
POINT IV 
THERE WERE NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE GENOVESI RESIDENCE 
A. Federal Constitution: 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that all 
searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause. See U.S. Const. 
amend. IV. A warrantless search of a citizen's residence is per se unreasonable unless the 
government shows that the search falls within a recognized exception, Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032 (1971), such as when a life may be in 
43
 Compare Robinson, 797 P.2d at 438 (consent involuntary where "[t]here is no 
evidence that Robinson was aware or was informed that he did not have to accede to 
the trooper's request [to search]") with State v. Hargraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (consent voluntary where defendant read and signed consent form) and State 
v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (consent voluntary where defendant 
in residential search was given consent form to sign and told if she did not consent to 
warrantless search one would not be conducted). 
- 3 3 -
danger or evidence destroyed, Schrember v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 
1835-36 (1966); Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 391, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2412 (1978). 
In Mincy, narcotics officers were attempting to purchase drugs at the 
defendant's residence. When the officers attempted to effectuate an arrest, a shootout 
ensued in which an undercover officer was killed. Without a warrant, the officers searched 
the defendant's residence for four days, ripping up carpets and walls to uncover 
incriminating evidence. Id. at 385, 98 S. Ct. at 2409. The Supreme Court held that the 
police may respond to emergency of life threatening situations without a warrant. 
However, once the emergency dissipates, the police no longer have the authority to conduct 
a warrantless search of a homicide scene. The Court specifically rejected the notion that 
a possible homicide inevitably presents an emergency situation as to create a "murder scene 
exception" to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 386, 98 S. Ct. 
at 2413-14.44 
In Stale v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), after making several 
controlled drug buys, police officers entered and searched the defendant's residence without 
a warrant, upon a believe that the money given the defendant by the informant could be 
destroyed. This Court similarly recognized that preservation of evidence is an exigent 
"Accord, Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 105 S. Ct. 409 (1984); 
Commonwealth v. Lewin, 407 Mass. 617, 555 N.E.2d 551 (1990); State v. Hockenhull, 525 
A.2d 926 (R.I. 1987); Slate v. Jennings, 461 A.2d 361 (R.I. 1983). 
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circumstance that makes a search imperative. However, this Court found no exigent 
circumstance where the controlled buy had already taken place, there was no known 
danger, and the officers could have easily obtained a telephonic warrant. See id. at 1291-92. 
See also State v. Case, 752 P.2d 356 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)(no exigent circumstance justified 
warrantless entry where emergency had dissipated before police arrival). 
The warrantless search in this case took place one day after the alleged 
emergency. There no longer present any exigent circumstance preventing the officers from 
obtaining a warrant, including a telephonic warrant. All occupants of the Genovesi 
residence had been removed and the residence secured at this point. Thus, all the evidence 
seized pursuant to the warrantless search should have been suppressed by the district court. 
See Hockenhull, 525 A.2d at 926 (after apartment secured, officer returned with 
investigative equipment to photograph and take measurements; Court found search illegal 
because "exigency that justified the entry onto the premises [had] terminated"). 
B. State Constitution: 
1. The Home As A Castle 
A citizen's home is his or her castle and it is a place where he or she should 
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. See Northnip, 756 P.2d at 1290 
(warrantless entry into home is evil in its most obnoxious form)(citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 
466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097 (1984). Accord, Stale v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 
1133 (Utah Ct App. 1991). Consequently, "the warrant requirement is an important check 
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upon the power of the State to subject individuals to unreasonable searches and seizures 
and is not to be lightly disregarded." Stale v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1986) 
(emphasis added). Accord, Stale v. Dunn, P.2d , 1993 WL 79651, at 13 (Utah 
1993). The corollary being the judiciary, rather than the executive branch, shall determine 
reasonableness of a search after a showing of probable cause. State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 
481 (Utah 1981) (Wilkins, J., concurring). 
In that context, Utah law has pervasive regard for the sanctity of the home. 
See, e.g., Utah Const, art. 1, § 6 (right to bear arm to protect one's residence); Utah Const, 
art. 1, § 14 (prohibiting warrantless residential searches) State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382 
(Utah 1986)(warrantless residential searches are per se unreasonable); Utah Const, art. 1, 
§ 22 (private property shall not be taken without just compensation); Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-405 (1992) (authorizing use of deadly force in defense of one's residence) State v. 
Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 577 (Utah 1987) (Stewart, J. dissenting) (citizen can use force even 
against a police officer if officer violates Constitution by making warrantless entry into 
residence). 
The Utah appellate courts have also been exceptionally critical of warrantless 
residential searches.45 Thus, when the State, as here, conducts a warrantless residential 
45
 See State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987); Stale v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 
1986); Ramirez, 814 P.2d at 1133; State v. Mclnlire, 768 P.2d 970 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); cf State v. Case, 752 R2d 356 
(Utah ct. App. 1987); see generally Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 580 (Bench, J. dissenting) 
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search, "the burden on [it becomes] particularly heavy" "to show both probable cause and 
exigent circumstances." Ramirez, 814 P.2d at 1133. Consequently, the maxim in this state, 
particularly when it comes to residential searches, remains, "warrants-when-practicable is 
the best policy." State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1345 n. 5 (Utah Ct App. 1991). Enforcing 
that maxim more bluntly, the Utah Supreme Court has concluded: "[Warrantless searches 
will be permitted only where they satisfy their traditional justification, namely, to protect 
the safety of police or the public, or to prevent destruction of evidence." State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990); see also Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1255 (warrantless residential 
searches are permitted only upon exigent circumstances); Northrup, 756 P.2d at 1288 (the 
exigency of a warrantless search must be imperative). 
The instant case involves a warrantless residential search, and the State has 
made no such claim of exigent circumstances. See Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress, R.88 (attached herein as Addendum III). Indeed, the State has 
maintained all along that this search was consensual. See id. In addition, Patrick testified 
that the exigency had dissipated at the time the officers arrived at the Genovesi residence. 
Moreover, the officers had sufficient time to apply for a warrant to search the residence. 
Thus, anticipating an exigent circumstances claim by the State in this Court, Genovesi urges 
(general warrants and writs of assistance used under British Colonial rule have no place 
in modern day Utah). 
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this Court to conclude that the warrantless search conducted at his residence independently 
violated article 1, section 14, of the Utah constitution. 
POINT V 
GENOVESI WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO A JURY REPRESENTING 
THE CROSS-SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY WHEN THE DISTRICT 
COURT ELIMINATED FROM THE VENIRE PERSONS WITH 
SURNAMES BEGINNING WITH LETTERS "A" THROUGH "R". 
A. Standard of Review 
Whether the facts on the record before this Court show a violation of 
Genovesi's constitutional and statutory rights to a jury representing the cross-section of the 
community is a question of law reviewed for correction of error. See Casianeda v. Partida, 
430 U.S. 482, 482, 97 S. Ct. 1272, 1274 (1977); State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 
1992); Stale v. Paz, 798 P.2d 1, 7 (Idaho 1990). 
B. The District Court's Decision is Incorrect 
The jury clerk for the district court testified in this case that the computer 
had initially selected 4,000 prospective jurors at random from the master jury list. Out of 
that number 2,900 names were qualified for jury service. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-12 
(1992). Then, the computer was asked to select a smaller pool of jurors to serve in this 
case. Rather than selecting a pool consisting of surnames beginning with letters "A" 
through ,fZ", the computer erroneously selected names in blocks, with significant number 
of names beginning with "SM and !Tf and excluding most other alphabets (Tr.7-9). Genovesi 
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timely objected to that procedure. Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-16(1) (1992); Utah R. Crim. 
P. 18(c); State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 776 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). After hearing 
arguments from the parties, Judge Young acknowledged that people whose surnames began 
with letters "S" and "T" predominate the venire. Tr. 17. He concluded, however: "But I 
don't see anything in this that would cause me to believe that any particular cognizable 
group has been systematically left out of the pool. Therefore, [defendant's] objection is 
denied." Tr. 17-18. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a 
criminal defendant the right to a trial by an impartial jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 148-49, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1446-47 (1968); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 592 n.6, 96 S. 
Ct. 1017 (1976). Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution similarly provides the right 
to an impartial jury. See Utah Const, art. 1, § 12; State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 P. 
941, 942 (1925); State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 
651 (Utah 1991). See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-12 el seq. (1992). This guarantees 
require that the jury be selected from among a cross-section of those persons eligible in the 
community for jury service. Hoty v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59, 82 S. Ct. 159, 161 (1961); 
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S. Ct. 664, 668 (1979); State v. Bankhead, 111 P.2d 
216, 217 (Utah 1986). 
To establish a prima facie violation of the right to an impartial jury selected 
from a cross-section of the community, the movant must show: 
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(1) That the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the 
community; (2) that the representation of this group in the venires from 
which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number 
of such persons in the community; (3) that this underrepresentation is due 
to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. 
Duren, 439 U.S. at 364, 99 S. Ct. at 668. See generally Redd v. Negley, 785 P.2d 1098, 1100 
(Utah 1989)(citing Duren with approval). 
1. Distinctiveness of Group46 
A particular group "must be of sufficient numerousity and distinctiveness to 
be cognizable for fair cross-section purposes." Tillman, 750 P.2d at 575-766 (citing Taylor 
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531, 95 S. Ct. 692, 698 (1975) and Duren, 439 U.S. at 364, 370, 
99 S. Ct. at 668, 671). See also Panida, 430 U.S. at 494, 97 S. Ct. at 1280. "This standard 
certainly implies a factual determination which turns upon the relevant characteristics of 
the particular community." Tillman, 750 P.2d at 576.47 "The distinctiveness and 
homogeneity of a group under the sixth amendment depends upon the time and location 
of the trial." Wills v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 1983). 
46
 Because this case involves a sixth amendment fair cross-section challenge, as 
opposed to an equal protection challenge, Genovesi has standing to attack the jury 
selection process regardless of his race or class. See Slate v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 575 
n.126 (Utah 1987). 
47
 Mere statistical underrepresentation of a group is sufficient to demonstrate 
discrimination against the group under the sixth amendment. See State v. Span, 819 
P.2d 329, 341-42 (Utah 1991). 
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The issue before this Court is one of first impression. However, Genovesi's 
argument --that the exclusion from the venire of a significant number of persons whose 
surnames began with letters "A" through MR" is violative of the state and federal 
constitutions' cross-section requirement - is not novel. Applying the cross-section analysis, 
numerous courts have upheld claims of groups identified by age, religion, economic status 
and occupation. See Comment, The Cross-Section Requirement and Jury Impartiality, 73 
Calif.L.Rev. 1555,1562 (1985). See, e.g., Paz, 798 P.2d at 7 (People with Hispanic surnames 
represent distinct group in the community).48 
There is no question that persons whose surnames start with letters "A" 
through "R" in Salt Lake County and who qualify for jury service are of "sufficient 
numerousity and distinctiveness as to be cognizable for fair cross-section purposes." 
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 575-76.49 Moreover, in his influential study of surnames, Dr. Trevor 
48
 But cf. State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 596 n.3 (Utah 1988)("We reserve judgment on 
whether Hispanics are a distinctive group under sixth amendment fair cross-section 
analysis."). 
49
 Genovesi urges this Court to take judicial notice of this fact. Utah R. Evid. 201. 
Further, the use of judicial notice in this case is not an attempt to circumvent the rule 
against raising issues for the first time on appeal. Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista 
Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 769 P.2d 819 (Utah 1988). This 
issue was raised and ruled upon below. See Tr. 17-18. In addition, counsel for Genovesi 
urged the district court clerk to provide him with the number of prospective jurors 
whose surnames began with letters "A" through "R" and who were eliminated from the 
venire by computer error. When the clerk refused to provide the statistics, counsel filed 
a motion in this Court on May 28, 1993, for an Order compelling the district court clerk 
to provide the information requested. As of the day of filing this Brief, this Court has 
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Weston found that those whose surnames start with letters "A" through "R" are 50% less 
likely to have a condition called "alphabetic neurosis" than those with surnames beginning 
with letters "S" through "Z". See Autry and Barker, Academic Correlates of Alphabetical 
Order of Surname, 8 J. Sch. Psychology 22, 22 (1970). As such, the venire assembled in 
Genovesi's case, consisting predominantly of people with alphabetic neurosis, clearly 
excludes a distinct group -- those who are less likely to have the neurosis. Therefore, the 
district court's decision that a distinct group had not been excluded for fair cross-section 
purposes is incorrect and should be reversed. 
2. Fair and Reasonable Representation of Group 
The next criteria of the Duren test is whether representation in the jury pool 
of persons with surnames beginning with letters A through R was "fair and reasonable in 
relation to the number of such persons in the community." Duren, 439 U.S. at 364, 99 S. 
Ct. at 668. Accord, Tillman, 750 P.2d at 576. 
By comparing a benchmark percentage of a cognizable group appearing in 
the population with the percentage of the group appearing on jury panels, it 
is possible to obtain some measure of whether panels are being constituted 
in a manner representative of a fair cross-section of the community. 
not ruled on the motion for an Order; nor has the Court granted counsel an extension 
to file the Brief. The statistics requested by counsel are virtually indispensable in 
establishing that the jury that convicted Genovesi did not represent a cross-section of 
the community. See Tillman, 750 P.2d at 576-77 and n. 138 (illustrating how statistical 
data are vital in these type of cases); Negley, 785 P.2d at 1100 (same); Paz, 798 P.2d at 8 
(same). 
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^.(citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 364, 99 S. Ct. at 668). As of July 1, 1992, the estimate 
population of Salt Lake County is 765,399. See Utah Office of Planning and Budget, 
Demographic and Economic Analysis, Utah Data Guide, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Jan. 1993). 
However, because Genovesi has been unable to obtain the numbers of 
prospective jurors whose surnames began with letters "A" through "R," who were 
erroneously eliminated from the venire, see supra note 49, an absolute benchmark 
comparison is impossible in this case. Suffice it to say that a significant number of people 
with surnames beginning from "A" through "R" were not fairly represented on the jury that 
convicted Genovesi. Because the jury "is not representative of the community, the process 
is constitutionally defective ab initio." People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 759 (Cal. 1978). Cf. 
Stale v. Bates, 22 Utah 65, 61 P. 905 (1900)(trial before unlawful jury rendered conviction 
void). The jury pool in this case was "made up of only special segments of the populace," 
thereby violating the constitutional requirement that a jury be broadly representative of the 
community as to guard against arbitrary power of the State." Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-3, 95 
S. Ct. at 697-98. 
3. Systematic Exclusion 
The third prong of the Duren test is whether underrepresentation of this 
group in the jury selection is due to systematic exclusion. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364, 99 
S. Ct. at 668; Tillman, 750 P.2d at 575-76. Systematic exclusion means that the disparity 
- 4 3 -
complained of is "inherent in the particular jury selection process utilized." Duren, 439 U.S. 
at 366, 99 S. Ct. at 669. Explicit in Genovesi's claim is that the jury panel in this case was 
devoid of people whose surnames began with letters "A" through "R," and therefore 
inherently not representative of the cross-section of the community. 
Granted the exclusion of this group was due to computer, rather than human, 
error. That distinction, however, is of no constitutional significance. In a fair cross-section 
case, "a defendant is not required to show bad faith, and a prima facie showing of 
systematic exclusion may not be rebutted by proof of a non-discriminatory intent." Tillman, 
750 P.2d at 575 n. 126 (citation omitted). 
Thus, Genovesi urges this Court to hold that the exclusion from the venire 
of persons who surnames began with letters "A" through "R" denied him the right to a jury 
representing a cross-section of the community. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF REQUESTED 
Because the district court's findings and conclusions are inadequate, this 
Court should remand the case for further findings and conclusions. In the alternative, this 
Court should reverse the district court's decision refusing to suppress the evidence seized 
from Genovesi. In addition, this Court should reverse the district court's decision on the 
jury selection issue and hold that the procedure utilized violated Genovesi's constitutional 
right to an impartial jury. 
- 4 4 -
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
This case is fact-sensitive and counsel believes oral argument will aid the 
Court in disposing the issues. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of June, 1993. 
BRADLEY P. RICH 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant, this day of June, 1993, to Janet C. Graham, Utah 
Attorney General, 235 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114. 
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ADDENDUM I 
WHlT&ake Coun€y A t t o r n e y 
JAMES M. COPE, 072 6 
THOMAS P. VUYK, 3342 
Deputy County Attorneys 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. ] 
JASON THOMAS GENOVESI, ) 
Defendant. ) 
• FINDINGS AND ORDER 
) fiurr\6*> to Sc*#W*S 
1 Case No. 921900681FS 
> Judge David S. Young 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence acquired by a 
search of defendant's residence came on regularly for hearing the 
19th day of August 1992. The court heard the testimony of Kenneth 
Patrick, considered the arguments of counsel, and finds that: 
1. Officer Patrick believed, prior to beginning the 
search of defendant's residence, that he had obtained permission 
from defendant's wife to do so. 
2. The law in Utah allows one spouse to consent to the 
search of property owned or used jointly with the other spouse. 
3. Lisa Genovesi, the wife of defendant, did tell 
Kenneth Patrick, in a 21 March 1992 telephone conversation, that 
he could go to defendant's and her residence to search for and 
collect evidence pertinent to the death of Gavin Adams. 
neon 2 
jr^pp**^-
Lj f r u Clerk 
**?ib2$. 
oT 921900681*6 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is therefore DENIED, 
DATED this ^ *—day of September, 1992. 
BY THE COURT?/?% 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the day of September, 1992, I 
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings and 
Order to G. Fred Metos, attorney for defendant, 72 East 400 South, 
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
















3 The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
npose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no Jegaf or other reason why sentence 
hould not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted byjala jury; D the court; O plea of guilty; 
i plea of no contest; of the offense of ASCLAAAA , a felony 
f thera«i ^degree, D a class misdemeanor, being ndw present in,court and ready for sentence and 
^presented b y ^ r YKi&^s , and the State being represented by y L&pA^ j s now adjudged guilty 
f the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
years and which may be for life; 3 to a maximum mandatory term of 
3 not to exceed five years; 
i of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years 
3 of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
3 not to exceed years; 
( and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ /c3Sfc7 f ^ < ^ */&6J'&0 &UA*AOA ^ j f * * ^ ^ ^ 
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 2 L J B L ^ J O . S<0 
such sentence is to run concurrently with 
such sentence is to run consecutively with 
upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
lSkjuJ)<L^hlX ±1) fa 0f%*M^ J PAJ^^& < ^ fcrrJl* <^^<^U 
hereby dismissed. 
Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake Coug^f ln^del ivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jgft^f tere defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and C o m m ^ ^ ^ ! X ^ ; . 's 
Commitment shall issue ~4{M£^AM£71 f!z%? 'X?K' ' 
JL day of MUL * i 
PROVED AS TO FORM; 
)UF JDGE 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page . _Z_of_^_ 
(Whit©— Court) (Green—Judge) (Yeltow—J«il/Pnson/AP4P) (Pink—Defense) (Goktenrod—Slate) 000224 
ADDENDUM III 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JAMES M. COPE, 0726 
THOMAS P. VUYK, 3342 
Deputy County Attorneys 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
v. ] 
JASON GENOVESI, ] 
Defendant. ) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE 
) TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
> Case No. 921900681FS 
> Judge David S. Young 
The plaintiff urges the court deny defendant's motion to 
suppress on the grounds and for the reason that the facts of this 
case clearly show police officers obtaining the evidence in 
question after a search authorized by defendant's wife, Lisa 
Genovesi. The plaintiff has provided the defendant with a 
transcript of the March 21, 1992 telephone conversation between 
Lisa Genovesi and Detective Ken Patrick. At the conclusion of 
this conversation, Detective Patrick, in good faith, believed that 
Lisa Genovesi had given him permission to enter defendant's home 
and search for evidence without a warrant. 
The court should deny defendant's motion to suppress 
because the evidence was legally obtained. 
MS J 2 1992 
-.-JtyCte-K 
cn\cir p ?< 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 921900681FS 
DATED th is O day of August, 1992 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
COPE / \ 'ES M. 
eputy\ County Attorney 
ati 
THOMAS P . VUYK 
Deputy County Attorney 
\! 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the /3JA. day of August, 1992, I mailed 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to G. Fred Metos, 
attorney for defendant, 72 East 400 South, Suite 330, Salt Lake 




1 P £H E IHMi 
2 JUDGE YOUNG: THE RECORD MAY SHOW THAT WE'RE 
3 CONVENED IN REGARD TO THE CASE OF THE STATE VERSUS JASON 
4 THOMAS GENOVESI. THE CASE NUMBER IS 92-1900681. 
5 THIS IS THE DATE SET FOR A JURT TRIAL IN THE 
6 DISTRICT COURT. MR. GENOVESI IS PRESENT IN THE CHAMBERS 
7 OF THE COURT. 
8 COUNSEL, I'LL ASK YOU EACH TO STATE YOUR APPEAR-
9 ANCES AS WELL. 
10 MR. METOS: FRED METOS ON BEHALF OF THE DEFEN-
11 DANT. 
12
 MS. HORNAK: KIM HORNAK FOR THE STATE. 
13
 MR. COPE: JAMES COPE FOR THE STATE. 
14 JUDGE YOUNG: THE COURT HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION 
15 WHICH I CALLED COUNSEL ABOUT YESTERDAY, THAT DUE TO A CIR-
16 CUMSTANCE THAT I DON'T KNOW THAT THERE IS AN EXPLANATION 
1 7
 FOR, THE RANDOM COMPUTER PROGRAM THAT HAS PICKED THE POOL 
18
 I OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS HAS, FOR SOME REASON, FAVORED THE 
"S'S" AND "T'S" OF THAT POOL. AND WE HAVE HERE THE JURY 
CLERK FOR THE DISTRICT COURT. AND I WILL ASK YOU FIRST, 
IF YOU WILL, TO STATE YOUR NAME FOR THE RECORD AND, SECOND, 
WOULD YOU EXPLAIN WHAT YOU KNOW ABOUT HOW THIS HAPPENED 
AND WHAT HAPPENED. 
MS. MEYER: JANE M. MEYER. 









 I BE APPROPRIATE TO PUT HER UNDER OATH? 
2
 I JUDGE YOUNG: I DON'T MIND HAVING HER PLACED 
3
 I UNDER OATH IF YOU'D LIKE. 
4
 | EILEEN, WILL YOU SWEAR HER IN, PLEASE 
5 
6
 ' JANE MEYER, 
7












JUDGE YOUNG: MS. MEYER, WOULD YOU TELL US WHAT 
HAS HAPPENED WITH THE PROGRAM AS YOU UNDERSTAND IT? 
THE WITNESS: WHAT HAS HAPPENED IS THE DISTRICT 
COURT AND THE CIRCUIT COURTS ARE COMBINING THEIR COURTS 
TOGETHER AND THE JURY POOL IS THE FIRST ITEM THAT IS 
TOGETHER. SO WHAT WE HAVE DONE IS WE HAVE TAKEN OVER THE 
WHOLE SALT LAKE COUNTY FOR JURORS AND WE'VE COMBINED THOSE 
LISTS TOGETHER, WHICH WE GET A LARGER POOL. SO WE HAVE 
4,000 EXTRA JURORS FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY. SO WE ARE 
DEALING WITH A LARGER POOL THAN USUAL IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
19
 | SO WE HAVE FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 4,000 JURORS AND IT 
2 0
 ' IS THE FIRST MONTH WE HAVE STARTED THIS POOL. 
21
 | THE NAMES ARE DRAWN FROM THE STATE ADMINISTRATOR'S; 
22 OFFICE AND ARE AT RANDOM SELECTION. THESE NUMBERS ARE RAN-
DOMLY SELECTED FROM THE SALT LAKE COUNTY. THEY ARE GIVEN 
2 4
 I COMPUTER NUMBERS AND THEN ARE PULLED RANDOMLY, THE 4,000 
NAMES ARE PULLED RANDOMLY FROM THIS JURY WHEEL, AND THEN 
23 
25 
1 I QUALIFY AND DISQUALI FY —OR THE DISTRICT COURT QUALIFIES 
2 AND DISQUALIFIES JURORS AND WE COME UP WITH QUALIFIED JURORS 
3 WE HAVE ABOUT 2,963 JURORS THAT ARE QUALIFIED AND THEN THE 
4 REST ARE EXCUSED AND POSTPONED AND SO FORTH. OUT OF THESE 
5 2,000 SOME NUMBER WE HAVE A LARGER POOL. 
6 WHAT HAPPENS IS THE COMPUTER HAS PLACED THESE 
7 RANDOM NAMES IN A COMPUTER THAT I HAVE DOWNSTAIRS LOCATED 
8 ON MY DESK. I'M THE ONLY ONE THAT HAS ACCESS TO THIS PARTI-
9 CULAR COMPUTER. AND WHAT WE DO IS WE PULL QUALIFIED JURORS 
10 FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY. I'VE PULLED 50 JURORS FOR THE 
11 WEST VALLEY COURT, 250 FOR OUR COURT HERE AND 20 FOR THE 
12 SANDY. AND WHAT HAS HAPPENED, WHEN WE REALIZED THIS, IT 
13 IS PULLING OUT OF BLOCKS. IT IS A RANDOM SELECTION BUT 
14 NOT ENOUGH OF A RANDOM, ANOTHER RANDOM MIX. 
15 AND SO WHAT WE'RE DOING IS WE'RE PULLING--OUT 
16 OF THE RANDOMNESS WE ARE PULLING OUT BLOCKS OF "S'S." AND 
17 WHAT THE COMPUTER HAS RANDOMLY DONE HAS TAKEN A NUMBER, 
18 STOPPED, AND THEN PICKED SOME NAMES AND THEN JUMPED AGAIN 
19 AND PICKED SOME MORE NAMES OUT OF BLOCKS. 
2 0
 JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA HOW MANY BLOCKS 
21
 THERE ARE? 
2 2
 THE WITNESS: I DON'T. 
2 3
 JUDGE YOUNG: ARE THE BLOCKS DIVIDED BY ALPHA-
2 4
 BETICAL LETTER? 
2 5
 THE WITNESS: NO. THEY ARE JUST A RANDOM NUMBER 
1 THAT THE COMPUTER PROGRAMMER PUT IN AND HE, HIMSELF, DIDN'T 
2 KNOW THAT NUMBER. 
3 JUDGE YOUNG: HE DIDN'T REALIZE THAT PROGRAM 
4 CONTAINED THOSE BLOCKS OR DIFFERENT SUBDIVISIONS WITHIN 
5 THE 2,900 PLUS JURORS? 
6 THE WITNESS: THEY DIDN'T REALIZE IT WOULD BE 
7 A PROBLEM SINCE THEY ARE RANDOMIZED ALREADY. SINCE I AM 
8 THE LARGEST DISTRICT COURT POOLING NAMES, THE SMALLER 
9 COUNTIES DIDN'T HAVE THIS PROBLEM. WE HAVE SUCH A LARGE 
10 AMOUNT OF PEOPLE THAT ARE IN THE DISTRICT COURT THAT WE 
11 HAVE OVER 250 "S'S" IN OUR LIST. 
12 JUDGE YOUNG: 250 TOTAL "S'S"? 
13 THE WITNESS: MORE THAN THAT BECAUSE I PULLED 
14 250 NAMES FOR THIS PARTICULAR LISTING THIS WEEK, THE 5TH 
15 THROUGH THE 9TH. 
16 JUDGE YOUNG: SO WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IS, OUT OF 
17 THE 2,900 TO HAVE QUALIFIED YOU HAVE MORE THAN 250 THAT 
18 ARE "S'S." I NOTICE, FOR INSTANCE, IN OUR SELECTED NUMBER 
19 PROPOSED HERE I HAVE ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SIX, SEVEN 
20 EIGHT, NINE, TEN, ELEVEN, TWELVE, THIRTEEN, FOURTEEN, FIF-
21 TEEN, 5IXTEEN, SEVENTEEN "S'S." NOW YOU'RE SAYING OUT OF 
22 THOSE 17 "S'S" THERE WERE 250 "S'S" AND IT HAS RANDOMIZED 
23 WITHIN THE "S'S?" 
24 THE WITNESS: GIVE OR TAKE THE BLOCKS, IT HAS 
25 TAKEN GROUPS OF THE "S'S." WE DO HAVE SOME "T'S." WEST 
1 VALLEY GOT "R'S" IN THE RANDOM MIX BECAUSE WE HAVE A MAN-
2 DATORY SUMMONS AND IT PULLS THOSE NAMES RANDOMLY BECAUSE 
3 THEY HAVE A VAST NUMBER TO BE SET FOR THAT PARTICULAR WEEK 
4 AND IT HAS RANDOMLY SELECTED THOSE FOR WEST VALLEY. THEY 
5 WERE FINE BUT SANDY HAD "W'S." THEY ENDED UP WITH THE BLOCK,! 
6 JUMPED THAT MUCH, AND GOT "W'S." I HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING— 
7 THEY ARE RANDOM. THEY ARE QUALIFIED RANDOMIZED JURORS. 
8 JUDGE YOUNG: SO WHAT YOU'RE SAYING THEN IS OF 
9 THE INITIAL POOL OF 4,000 YOU QUALIFIED NEARLY THREE, 2,900 
10 PLUS, THEN FROM THAT 2,900 YOU ASK THE COMPUTER TO MAKE 
11 A RANDOM SELECTION BUT IT HAD DIFFERENT BLOCKS WITHIN ITS 
12 PROGRAM THAT YOU DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT AND WITHIN THAT BLOCK 
13 IT HAS RANDOMLY SELECTED THE "S'S" OR THE "T'S" OR THE 
14 "R'S" OR WHATEVER. 
15 THE WITNESS: YES. 
16 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. NOW LET ME ASK EITHER 
17 OF YOU IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OF THE JURY CLERK AS TO 
18 THAT SELECTION SYSTEM. 
19 MR. METOS: I AM A LITTLE BIT CONFUSED BY THE 
20 BLOCK SYSTEM. HOW MANY POTENTIAL JURORS WOULD BE IN A BLOCK 
21 THE WITNESS: WE HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING. 
22 MR. METOS: AND YOU HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING HOW 
23 THESE BLOCKS ARE SELECTED, WHETHER IT'S THROUGH THIS NUMBER-
24 ING SYSTEM OR ARE ALPHABETICALLY--






 | LOOKING TO ME ON THE SHEET WAS THAT IT WAS GOING BY ALPHA 
2
 I BETIZING BUT THE COMPUTER PROGRAMMER TOLD ME THEY WOULD 
SOMETIMES ALSO PULL 'EM BY COMPUTER NUMBER. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IS THAT AN INDIVIDUAL ASSIGNED 
5
 | JUROR NUMBER TO AN INDIVIDUAL QUALIFIED JUROR? 
6
 I THE WITNESS: YES. AND THEY WILL KEEP THAT FOR 
THE REST OF THEIR LIVES. 
MR. METOS: YOU SAID THERE'S SOME 2,900 PLUS 
9
 | QUALIFIED JURORS IN THE COMPUTER. NOW IS THAT RIGHT? 
10
 I THE WITNESS: YES, AFTER THE INITIAL—WE PULLED 
11
 I JURORS FOR THE LAST TWO WEEKS, WHICH WE STILL HAVE THE SAME 
12
 | PROBLEM OF COMBINING. NOW, NEXT MONDAY, OR NEXT WEEK, WE 
HAVE ALL "M'S." 
14
 I MR. METOS: NO, MY QUESTION IS, YOU START OUT 
15
 WITH 4,000, YOU SEND OUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE, THEY BRING IT 
16
 BACK, YOU ELIMINATE 1,030 SOMETHING--
17
 I THE WITNESS: THROUGH DISQUALIFYING, UNABLE TO 
LOCATES AND SO FORTH, YES. 
MR. METOS: OF THOSE 2,900 THAT WERE LEFT IN 
THE QUALIFIED JURORS, LEFT IN THE POOL, IN THE LAST WEEK 
YOU'VE PULLED OUT A NUMBER OF JURY PANELS; IS THAT RIGHT? 
THE WITNESS: MM-HMM. (YES). 
MR. METOS: AND YOU'RE SAYING OF THOSE YOU PULLED 
2 4
 I OUT SOME 250 PEOPLE WITH LAST NAMES THAT BEGIN WITH "S"? 
2 5







1 MY MATERIAL WITH ME, A ROUGH 170. 
2 MR. METOS: LAST NAMES? 
3 THE WITNESS: AND THEN WE HAVE "T'S" AND "U'S" 
4 AND "V'S" ON THAT LIST. 
5 MR. METOS: BUT SO WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IS THE 
6 PEOPLE WHOSE NAMES ARE PULLED HAVE NAMES BEGINNING SOME-
7 WHERES AROUND "S" AND MAYBE GO TOWARDS THE END OF THE ALPHA 
8 BET. 
9 THE WITNESS: RIGHT. 
10 MR. METOS: AND VERY FEW FROM THE FIRST PART 
11 OF THE AL — 
12 THE WITNESS: LET ME HAVE YOU IMAGINE THIS. 
13 WE HAVE A GROUP OF NAMES HERE, "A" TO "Z.M WHAT THE COMPUTER" 
14 HAS DONE IS TAKEN A BLOCK THAT IT'S KIND OF SHIFTED DOWN, 
15 AND WHAT IT DOES IS IT TAKES THOSE NAMES DOWN AND THE COM-
16 PUTER HAS ALPHABETIZED THOSE SO IT'S STARTING—THE COMPUTER 
17 HAS TO HAVE SOME KIND OF ORGANIZATION SO IT HAS ALPHABETIZED 
18 IT. AND THE WAY THE COMPUTER PROGRAMMER HAD INDICATED IT 
19 IT WAS BLOCKS. NOW THAT WE HAVE CHANGED THAT IT WILL GO 
20 ONE PERSON AT A TIME AND RANDOMLY SELECT THEM OUT. AND 
21 THAT'S WHAT WE USED TO HAVE. WE DIDN'T REALIZE THIS PROBLEM 
22 EXISTED UNTIL IT WAS TOO LATE. 
23 MR. METOS: SO WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IS BY SELECTING 
24 BLOCKS OF PEOPLE YOU THINK THAT'S WHERE WE CAME UP WITH 
25 THE PROBLEM OF HAVING THEM ALL CENTRALIZED IN SEVERAL LETTER^ 
1 OF THE ALPHABET? 
2 THE WITNESS: YES. 
3 MR. METOS: AND IT WAS A RESULT OF A COMPUTER 
4 PROGRAM THAT WAS USED TO GENERATE THE NAMES OF THE POTENTIAL 
5 JURORS? 
6 THE WITNESS: YES. 
7 MR. METOS: OKAY. 
8 JUDGE YOUNG: ANY OTHER QUESTION? 
9 MR. COPE: COULD I ASK A QUESTION, YOUR HONOR? 
10 JUDGE YOUNG: CERTAINLY. 
11 MR. COPE: THE 2,900 NAMES THAT ARE QUALIFIED--
12 A GUESS A BETTER QUESTION WOULD BE, THE 4,000 JURORS THAT 
13 WERE ON THE ORIGINAL LIST, FROM WHICH YOU TOOK THE 2,900, 
14 DOES THAT INCLUDE PEOPLES' SURNAMES BEGINNING WITH "A" 
15 THROUGH "Z" OR IS THAT ONLY PEOPLE WHOSE SURNAMES BEGIN 
16 WITH "S," "T" AND, "U"? 
17 THE WITNESS: THE 4,000 WAS "A" TO "Z." 
18 MR. COPE: OKAY. AND THAT WAS A RANDOM SELECTION, 
19 THE ORIGINAL 4,000 NAMES WERE RANDOMLY SELECTED FROM SEVERAL 
20
 I TENS OF THOUSANDS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE IN SALT 
LAKE COUNTY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
THE WITNESS: YES. FOR ONE MONTH, YES. 
MR. COPE: OKAY. 
2 4
 I JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. ANY OTHER FACTUAL 
25





1 HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER? 
2 MR. COPE: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
3 JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER, MR. 
4 METOS, OF THE JURY CLERK? 
5 MR. METOS: OKAY. NOT OF THE JURY CLERK, NO. 
6 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. YOU MAY BE EXCUSED. 
7 (WHEREUPON, THE JURY CLERK LEAVES CHAMBERS). 
8 
9 JUDGE YOUNG: I WILL ASK YOU EACH THEN WHETHER 
10 YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO UTILIZING THE JURORS THAT WE HAVE 
11 BROUGHT FORWARD FOR THIS CASE. WHAT'S THE STATE'S POSITION 
12 FIRST? 
13 MR. COPE: YOUR HONOR, THE STATE HAS NO OBJEC-
14 TION. THE STATUTE, 78-46-12, INDICATES THAT THE ONLY 
15
 REQUIREMENT FOR RANDOMNESS IS THAT THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS, 
16
 THE 4,000, BE RANDOMLY SELECTED. THAT APPARENTLY HAS 
1? OCCURRED. THE FACT THAT THE COMPUTER, OR WHATEVER OTHER 
18
 I MECHANISM THAT IS UTILIZED HAS SELECTED IN A SPECIFIC MANNER 
DOESN'T SEEM TO ME TO IMPINGE UPON THE FAIRNESS OF EITHER 
THE POLICY OR THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATUTE. AND FOR 
THAT REASON THE STATE HAS NO OBJECTION. 
2 2







PROCEDURES THAT ARE TO BE USED BY ANYONE WHO OBJECTS TO 
THE WAY THE JURY IS SELECTED, THAT I DON'T.SEE THAT THE 
DEFENDANT HAS ANY GROUNDS FOR AN OBJECTION ON THE FACTS 
11 
1 AS I UNDERSTAND THEM. 
2 JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT IS THE STATUTE AGAIN? 
3 MR. COPE: 78-46-16. THAT STATUTE INDICATES 
4 THAT THE PROCEDURES OUTLINED THERE ARE THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS 
5 BY WHICH A PERSON ACCUSED OF A CRIME MAY CHALLENGE A JURY 
6 ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE JURY WAS NOT SELECTED IN CONFORMITY 
7 WITH THE ACT. 
8 I DON'T BELIEVE ANY EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PRESENTED 
9 BY THE DEFENDANT, OR ANYONE ELSE FOR THAT MATTER, OR BY 
10
 THE COURT SUA SPONTE THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT THE JURORS 
11
 ARE NOT QUALIFIED AND THIS PANEL SPECIFICALLY SHOULD NOT 
12 BE UTILIZED BY THIS COURT. 
13
 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. SO THE STATE HAS NO 
14
 OBJECTION TO THIS METHOD OF SELECTION AND, IN FACT, BELIEVES 
15
 THAT IT IS CONSISTENT WITH LAW. 
16
 MR. COPE: YES. 
17
 | JUDGE YOUNG: MR. METOS? 
MR. METOS: MY POSITION IS THAT THE SELECTION, 
AFTER THE NAMES GET INTO THE COMPUTER, AFTER SELECTION OFF 
THE JURY WHEEL, VIOLATES MR. GENOVESI'S RIGHT TO A FAIR 
21
 AND IMPARTIAL JURY AS GUARANTEED BY THE 6TH AMENDMENT AND 
2 2
 | ARTICLE 1 SECTION 12. SEVERAL CASES HAVE DISCUSSED THIS, 
NOT THIS PARTICULAR TYPE OF SITUATION, BUT CLAIMS THAT JURY 
PANELS FAIL TO BE COMPRISED OF A FAIR CROSS SECTION OF THE 








1 N-E-G-L-E-Y, 785 P2D 1098, ESTABLISHED A THREE-PART TEST 
2 FOR THE COURT TO USE IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT A FAIR 
3 CROSS SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY IS REPRESENTED IN THE JURY 
4 PANEL. 
5 THE COURT FIRST HAS TO DETERMINE IF THERE'S A 
6 COGNIZABLE GROUP THAT'S BEEN EXCLUDED; SECONDLY, IF THE 
7 REPRESENTATION ON THE PARTICULAR PANEL, THAT IS THE PANEL 
8 OF POTENTIAL JURORS FOR A PARTICULAR CASE, IS NOT FAIR AND 
9 REASONABLE IN RELATION TO PERSONS IN THE COMMUNITY AND; 
10 THIRDLY, WHETHER THE UNDER REPRESENTATION IS DUE TO A 
11 SYSTEMMATIC EXCLUSION FROM THE GROUP. 
12 WITH RESPECT TO WHAT IS A COGNIZABLE GROUP, 
13 STATE V. SPAN ADDRESSED THAT IN TERMS OF THE FAIR CROSS 
14 SECTION ISSUE UNDER THE 6TH AMENDMENT, AND ARGUABLY, UNDER 
15 ARTICLE 1 SECTION 12. THAT CASE IS FOUND AT 819 P2D 329. 
16 THERE THE COURT DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN A COGNIZABLE GROUP 
17 FOR PURPOSES OF EQUAL PROTECTION WHICH IS LIKE PROTECTED 
18 CLASSES BASED ON THINGS LIKE RACE OR GENDER AS OPPOSED TO 
19 SIMPLY A GROUP THAT YOU CAN RECOGNIZE AS BEING A DISTINCT 
20 GROUP. UNDER EQUAL PROTECTION YOU HAVE THESE PROTECTIVE 
21 CLASS SITUATIONS UNDER THE 6TH AMENDMENT. THE COURT RECOG-
22 NIZED A COGNIZABLE GROUP CAN BE ANYTHING. AND I SUBMIT 
23 THAT WHEN YOU EXCLUDE A LARGE PART OF PEOPLE--A LARGE PART 
24 OF THE COMMUNITY, BASED ON THE FIRST LETTER OF THEIR LAST 
25 NAME, YOU'VE CREATED A COGNIZABLE GROUP. AND I THINK THE 
13 
1 COURT CAN TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE FACT THAT THERE ARE 
2 MANY PEOPLE IN THIS COMMUNITY WHOSE NAMES DON'T BEGIN WITH 
3 THE LETTERS "S" THROUGH »W," OR WHERE WE'RE AT, AND THEY 
4 DO COMPRISE A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE COMMUNITY, AND THEY'RE 
5 NOT REFLECTED IN THIS PARTICULAR JURY PANEL. 
6 WITH RESPECT TO—I THINK I JUST ADDRESSED THE 
7 SECOND ISSUE, WHETHER THE REPRESENTATION IS FAIR AND REASON-
8 ABLE AS TO WHETHER THE PERSONS IN THE COMMUNITY, THAT IS, 
9 WE'VE GOT A LARGE GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO SIMPLY AREN'T REPRE-
10 SENTED JUST SIMPLY BASED ON THEIR ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF 
11 THEIR LAST NAME. 
12 FINALLY, ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE UNDER 
13 REPRESENTATION IS DUE TO A SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF THE GROUP 
14 IT APPEARS THAT THE SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION COMES IN THROUGH 
15 THE WAY THE COMPUTER GENERATED THESE NAMES. I DON'T THINK 
16 WE NEED TO, IN DETERMINING THIS ISSUE YOU DON'T NEED TO 
17 ASSESS FAULT AND SAY, YOU KNOW, THIS WAS DONE BY NEGLIGENCE 
18 OR INTENTIONALLY OR WHATEVER, IT'S JUST THAT IN THIS DAY 
19 AND AGE OF COMPUTERS AND COMPUTER PROGRAMS SOMEBODY PROGRAMEf) 
20 THIS COMPUTER AND THE RESULT OF THAT PROGRAM WAS THAT IT 
21 CUT OUT THIS LARGE GROUP OF PEOPLE FROM THE COMMUNITY OR 
22 FROM THIS PARTICULAR POLL THAT REPRESENT A DIFFERENT GROUP 
23 IN THE COMMUNITY AND THEY'RE NOT REPRESENTED ON THE JURY 
24 PANEL. SO.IT'S BASED ESSENTIALLY ON A COMPUTER PROGRAM, 
2 5
 WHICH I SUBMIT, IS A SYSTEMMATIC METHOD OF EXCLUSION. AND 
l*f 
1 BASED ON THAT I'D MOVE TO STRIKE THE JURY PANEL AS HAS BEEN 
2 SELECTED FOR THIS CASE. 
3 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. DO YOU WISH TO RESPOND? 
4 MR. COPE: I JUST NOTE THAT MR. METOS DID NOT 
5 TALK ABOUT THE THIRD FACTOR AND, THAT IS, THE DEMONSTRATION 
6 OF SOME SORT THAT THE DEFENDANT IS SOMEHOW GOING TO BE PRE-
7 JUDICED BY THIS PROCEDURE, WHATEVER IT IS. 
8 ALSO, I DON'T THINK THAT THE SYSTEMMATIC EXCLU-
9 SION CAN BE ARGUED BY THE WAY A COMPUTER WAS ASSIGNED OR 
10 GIVEN A PROGRAM AT RANDOMLY SELECT NUMBERS WHICH CORRESPONDS 
11 TO PEOPLE IN AN ALPHABETIZED LIST. AND I'D LIKE TO ASK 
12 THE COURT TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE FOR PURPOSES OF THIS MATTE 
13 OF THE ACTUAL NAMES ON THE LIST. I HAVE NOT YET SEEN THE 
14 LIST BUT APPARENTLY THERE ARE PEOPLE ON THERE WHOSE NAMES 
15 DO NOT BEGIN WITH "S" OR "T" OR "W" AND SO, THEREFORE, I 
16 THINK THAT UNDERCUTS HIS NOTION THAT PEOPLE ARE UNDER REPRE-
17 SENTED WHOSE NAMES DO NOT BEGIN WITH "S" OR "W." THE COURT 
18 WELL KNOWS THAT ON OCCASION THE NAMES GET DRAWN OUT OF A 
19 | BOX IN SUCH A FASHION THAT IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO 
SEAT A FEMALE ON THE JURY, OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT. THAT 
21 I TYPE OF THING IS WHAT'S GOING ON HERE WITH THE COMPUTER. 
2 2
 I THAT'S JUST ONE OF THE WAYS THAT IT HAPPENED. AND I BELIEVE 
THAT THE COURT WOULD HAVE AN APPROPRIATE JURY PANEL EVEN 
IF ALL OF THE NAMES THAT BEGAN WITH "A" AND "B," IF THE 








 SOMETHING LIKE THAT TO HAPPEN, AND STILL DEMONSTRATE RANDOM-
2
 I NESS, I THINK THAT'S PERFECTLY OKAY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU 
4
 I MR. METOS: CAN I BRIEFLY RESPOND TO A COUPLE 
5
 I OF THINGS SAID? PARTICULARLY HE RAISED THE ISSUE OF PREJU-
DICE. 
7
 | JUDGE YOUNG: BRIEFLY, BUT WE ARE NOT GOING TO 
8
 I GO BACK AND FORTH ON THIS FURTHER. 
MR. METOS: NO. SINCE IT WAS MY OBJECTION--
JUDGE YOUNG: GO AHEAD. 
MR. METOS: MR. COPE RAISED THE ISSUE OF PREJU-
DICE. I DON'T BELIEVE UNDER THE LAW, AS IT NOW STANDS, 
THAT WE NEED TO MAKE A SHOWING OF PREJUDICE. WHEN YOU'RE 
TALKING ABOUT JURY SELECTION YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT FAIRNESS 
IN THE FACT FINDER IN THE TRIAL AND NOT WHETHER THERE'S 
ANY PREJUDICE WITH RESPECT TO WHAT EVIDENCE WAS BROUGHT IN. 
WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF OTHER NAMES FROM 
OTHER PARTS OF THE ALPHABET THEY MAY BE THERE, BUT ONCE 
AGAIN I DON'T THINK, AND I THINK THE COURT CAN TAKE NOTICE, 
THAT DOESN'T REALLY REPRESENT A REAL CROSS SECTION OF THE 
COMMUNITY IN TERMS OF ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF LAST NAMES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. WELL, RESPONDING FROM 
MY PERSPECTIVE TO YOUR ARGUMENT, MR. METOS, IT SEEMS TO 
ME THAT THE ATTEMPT OF THE COURTS IN RECOGNIZING THAT THERE 



















1 BASIS THAT THERE MAY BE A PARTICULAR GROUP OF THE COMMUNITY, 
2 I.E., THE POOR, OR THE HISPANIC, WHATEVER THE IDENTIFIABLE 
3 GROUP IS, THAT COULD BE EXCLUDED, THAT THERE MAY BE PROBLEMS 
4 IF ANY OF THOSE PARTICULAR GROUPS WERE EXCLUDED. AND THE 
5 COURT FINDS IN THIS CASE THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO BELIEVg* 
6 THAT ANY RECOGNIZABLE GROUP HAS BEEN EXCLUDED, BECAUSE I 
7 DON'T THINK THAT THE COURT COULD RECOGNIZE, "SAY, FOR 
8 INSTANCE, "A" THROUGH "C" TO BE A PARTICULAR GROUP OF PEOPLE 
9 SURNAMES BEGIN WITH MULTIPLE LETTERS OF THE ALPHABET, "A" 
10 THROUGH "Z" PRESUMABLY, AND THE INITIAL GROUP QUALIFIED 
11
 WAS TOTALLY RANDOM, THE 2,900 WAS THEREAFTER, 2,900 PLUS, 
12
 THE JURY CLERK MENTIONED, WERE THEREAFTER SELECTED AT RANDOM 
13
 PLUS EXCUSES OR CONFLICTS OR WHATEVER ELSE SHE SAID WERE 
14
 I REASONS FOR HER TO PUT SOMEBODY INTO A LATER POOL OR TAKE 
THEM OUT OF THIS POOL. I DON'T FIND ANYTHING THAT WOULD 
INDICATE TO ME THAT THIS ISN'T A GOOD CROSS SECTION OF THE 
17
 | COMMUNITY, EVEN THOUGH IT HAPPENS TO BE THE "S'S" THROUGH 
18










AND SO THE RECORD IS CLEAR, I HAVE A DAVIES, 
A JENSEN, A PAULK, AND THEN WE GO INTO THE "S'S" AND THE 
"T'S." AND THE PRINCIPAL NUMBERS OF THESE ARE BY FAR THE 
"S'S" AND "T'S." THERE'S ULIBARRI AND UNANDER, U-N-A-N-D-E-R, 
BUT I DON'T SEE ANYTHING IN THIS THAT WOULD CAUSE ME TO 
BELIEVE THAT ANY PARTICULAR COGNIZABLE GROUP HAS BEEN 
SYSTEMATICALLY LEFT OUT OF THE POOL. THEREFORE, YOUR 
17 
1 OBJECTION IS DENIED. THE COURT WILL PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL 
2 WITH THOSE PERSONS SELECTED IN OUR COMPUTER SYSTEM. ALL 
3 RIGHT? 
4 SO LET'S GO INTO THE COURTROOM. WE'LL BRING 
5 UP THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS AND BEGIN A JURY SELECTION. 
6 MR. COPE: YOUR HONOR, COULD WE HAVE THE BENEFIT 
7 OF THE COURT'S TIME AND THE RECORD FOR JUST A MOMENT ABOUT 
8 SOME HOUSEKEEPING MATTERS? 
9 l JUDGE YOUNG: YES. 
MR. COPE: WE HAVE A COUPLE OF FAMILIES, MAYBE 








 I A TENDENCY TO MAYBE WANT TO INTERFERE OR HELP OUT WITH THE 
13
 I PROCEEDINGS A LITTLE BIT MORE THAN THE COURT WOULD ASK THEM 
14
 I TO. WE HAVE AN EX-HUSBAND'S FAMILY OF ONE OF OUR MATERIAL 
15
 WITNESSES, THE MOTHER OF ONE OF THE VICTIMS, WHO HAS 
16
 EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN, AND I THINK IT IS A VERY REAL CONCER^ 
17
 I THAT PEOPLE MIGHT WANT TO APPROACH HER OR TALK TO HER, DO 
THINGS IN COURT THAT WILL DISTRACT HER FROM TESTIFYING 
AND WE'D JUST LIKE TO ASK--I THINK BOTH OF US ARE AWARE 
OF THIS AND WORRIED ABOUT IT A LITTLE BIT. WE'D LIKE TO 
ASK THE COURT TO SORT OF WATCH--WE CAN'T SEE THEM BECAUSE 
2 2
 | THEY'RE BEHIND OUR BACKS—IF THE COURT WOULD SORT OF PAY 
23
 ' ESPECIAL ATTENTION TO THAT AND SEE IF THERE'S ANYTHING FUNNY 
2 4
 | GOING ON AND SORT OF KEEP THE BAILIFF ADVISED TO KEEP THAT 
25
 ' UNDER CONTROL. 
18 
